



Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Alisdair McKay
Department of Economics, Princeton University
January 2005
Abstract
We introduce a vintage capital model in which workers are matched
with machines of increasing quality. Quality improvements of the ma-
chines are the sole source of technological change in this economy.
However, the matching of workers with machines implies that there is
no well deﬁned capital aggregate in this economy. Hence, investment
price indices are a spurious measure of price changes in capital goods.
We show that the use of such spurious measures of investment price
changes in conjunction with standard growth accounting methods can
lead to the severe overstatement of the importance of quality improve-
ments of capital goods in our model. That is it can lead to spurious
measures of investment speciﬁc technological change.
keywords: imperfect competition, price indices, vintage capital.
JEL-code: O310, O470, C190.
∗Correspondence: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Domestic Research Function.
33 Liberty Street, 3rd ﬂoor. New York, NY 10045. E-mail: bart.hobijn@ny.frb.org. The
views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, nor those of the Federal Reserve System. This paper is based on FRBNY staﬀ
report #139, entitled “Is Equipment Price Deﬂation a Statistical Artifact?”. Comments
by Ana Aizcorbe, Boyan Jovanovic and Kevin Stiroh have been instrumental in writing
this paper.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many recent empirical studies of technological change have used changes in
the relative price of investment goods with respect to consumption goods
as a measure of the degree of investment speciﬁc or embodied technolog-
ical change. These studies include, among others, Greenwood, Hercowitz,
and Krusell (1997,2000), Violante, Ohanian, R´ ıos-Rull, and Krusell (2000),
Cummins and Violante (2002), Fisher (2002), and Altig, Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Linde (2005).
Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) were the ﬁrst to use the changes
in a quality adjusted capital price index relative to the changes in the con-
sumption price index as a measure of investment speciﬁc technological change
in a general equilibrium framework. They use the capital price index to de-
compose productivity growth in to disembodied Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) growth and growth induced by the decline of the quality adjusted
relative price of capital goods, known as investment speciﬁc technological
change.
Their analysis yields the result that, since the middle of the 1970’s,
the quality adjusted relative price decline of investment goods has acceler-
ated, therefore increasing the contribution of investment speciﬁc technologi-
cal change to U.S. output growth. This, in principle, is not inconsistent with
the observation that quality improvements in computers and other IT capital
goods have accelerated since the middle of the 1970’s. There is, however, one
catch.
The results in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) also yield that
the rate of investment speciﬁc technological change measured using the in-
vestment price index that they use implies that TFP growth in the U.S. has
been persistently negative between 1973 and 1990. The average annual de-
cline in TFP for the period between 1973 and 1990 reported in their analysis
is 0.9%.
I np r i n c i p l e ,i ti sn o th a r dt oc o m eu pw i t ha ne x p l a n a t i o nw h yT F P
could temporarily decline. It is much harder, however, to come up with a
story why TFP would decline persistently over a 17 year long period and
why this decline would exactly coincide with the time that investment spe-
ciﬁc technological change accelerates. This begs the question whether the
price index representing the relative price of capital might not be the ap-
propriate measure of investment speciﬁc technological change and whether
it might overstate the contribution of quality improvements of capital goods
2to economic growth.
In this paper we introduce a model in which it is the case that the ap-
plication of such a price index would overstate the importance of quality
improvements of capital goods for economic growth. Our model is a vintage
capital model, in the spirit of Johansen (1959), Arrow (1962), and Jovanovic
(1999,2004). In it, workers of diﬀerent skill levels are matched with machines
of diﬀerent and increasing quality. The quality improvements of machines
are the sole source of economic growth in our model. Each worker can only
use one machine, such that the capital labor ratio is ﬁxed. The assignment
of workers across machines means that capital vintages and labor are in-
tertwined to such a degree that there is no aggregate production function
representation in terms of labor and an aggregate capital stock.
The non-existence of an aggregate capital stock is nothing new. Fisher
(1969) already showed that, in case of embodied technological change, such
a capital stock only exists if the vintage speciﬁc production functions are
Cobb-Douglas. Because of the ﬁxed capital labor ratio, in our model the
vintage speciﬁc production functions are Leontieﬀ instead. The problem is
that the spurious application of a capital price index in the absence of an
aggregate capital stock can lead to very deceiving conclusions.
We show that when the same growth accounting methods used by Green-
wood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) are applied in our model they would
overestimate the contribution of capital deepening, i.e. quality improvements
of capital goods, to output growth and would lead to a downward bias in es-
timated TFP growth.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we introduce
our model economy. Because our argument does not hinge on transitional
dynamics, we consider a model that is always on its balanced growth path.
In Section 3 we derive the equilibrium balanced growth path of the economy
and proof its relevant properties. In Section 4 we ask two questions. The
ﬁrst is what we would like a growth accounting analysis in this economy to
yield. We derive an aggregate production function representation, show that
there is no aggregate capital stock and that there is no TFP growth. The
second question is what we would actually measure if we would apply the
growth accounting methods applied by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell
(1997) and would use a capital price index to identify quality improvements in
capital goods. We show that there is nothing that assures us that we obtain
the proper measure of TFP growth from this growth accounting exercise.
In Section 5, we back this claim up with a numerical example in which we
3choose the parameters in our model to satisfy long-run properties of the U.S.
economy. For these parameter values, the growth accounting exercise severely
overstates quality improvements in capital goods and yields negative TFP
growth, just like Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) ﬁnd for 1973-
1990. In Section 6 we discuss the implications of our results for the analysis
of productivity. We conclude in Section 7. Mathematical details are left for
Appendix A.
2M o d e l
The model that we introduce is a model of endogenous embodied technolog-
ical change. In our model a continuum of workers with heterogenous levels
of human capital in each period choose a type of machine that they use to
produce a homogenous ﬁnal good. The machines are supplied by a set of
ﬁrms that compete monopolistically. These ﬁrms each bid for a licensing fee
to produce the type of machines that they supply. This licensing fee in its
turn provides the resources for the R&D necessary to come up with a new
machine. The ﬁnal good is used as a consumption good and provides the
workers with utility.
The main results of this paper are easiest explained along a balanced
growth path. For this reason, we develop a model economy that is always on
its balanced growth path. This allows us to make the simplifying assumptions
of linear preferences and innovations of equal size at a constant frequency.
The following four subsections introduce the household, ﬁnal goods, cap-
ital goods, and R&D sectors of our model economy respectively.
2.1 Households
A household in our economy consists of one inﬁntely-lived worker. All house-
holds have linear preferences in the sense that a household, which, for reasons
explained below, we index by h,t h a tc o n s u m e sct+s (h)f o rs =0 ,1,2,...gets




sct+s (h)w h e r e0 < β < 1( 1 )
4The household maximizes this objective subject to the intertemporal budget
constraint that
at+s+1 (h)=( 1+rt+s)at+s (h)+wt+s (h)+πt+s − ct+s (h)( 2 )
Here at+s (h) denote the assetholdings of the household, in terms of the con-
sumption good, at the beginning of period t + s, rt+s is the real interest
rate at time t + s, wt+s (h) is the labor income the household makes of run-
ning its own business, πt+s are the dividend payments that the household
receives over the shares it owns in capital goods producing and research and
development ﬁrms1.
The households in this economy will thus make choices to do two things.
The ﬁrst is that they will make choices that maximize the present discounted
value of their proprietor’s income. The second is that their intertemporal
optimality condition implies that for consumption to be positive in each




≡ r for all t (3)
which is what we will assume throughout the rest of this paper.
2.2 Final goods producers
Each worker in our model economy supplies its labor to produce a homoge-
nous ﬁnal good. The labor is supplied to competitive ﬁrms in the ﬁnal goods
sector.
We will take a certain degree of heterogeneity among workers as given.
The relevant dimension of heterogeneity across workers is their human capital
levels. We denote the human capital level of a particular worker by h.T h e r e
is a continuum of workers of measure one whose human capital levels are
uniformly distributed over the unit-interval, such that h v unif (0,1).
Each worker produces a homogenous ﬁnal (consumption) good by com-
bining the unit of labor supplied by a worker, of type h, with one machine.
Just like workers, machines are also heterogenous in this economy. There
is a countable set of machines in each period. We denote a particular type,
1We will assume that the shares in these ﬁrms are equally distributed among the
households, because of which they all get equal dividend payments. However, as Caselli
and Ventura (2000) show, the aggregate behavior of our economy will not depend on the
distribution of shares.
5or vintage, of machine by τ2. Each vintage of machine embodies a diﬀerent
quality, where At−τ > 0d e n o t e st h en u m b e ro fe ﬃciency units embodied in
a machine of vintage age τ. Throughout, we will assume that there is no
technological regress such that At − At−1 > 0f o ra l lt.
The combination of a worker of type h and a machine of vintage age τ
yields hAt−τ units of output3.
In order to avoid having to consider intractable intertemporal optimiza-
tion problems and having to make assumptions about possible second hand
markets, we will assume that machines fully depreciate in one period. This
assumption basically implies that the machines considered here are equiv-
alent to intermediate goods in the sense of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and
Romer (1990). The workers can not use these machines for nothing.
The workers can not use these machines for nothing. The price of a
machine of quality At−τ at time t is Pt,τ. This price is measured in units of
the ﬁnal good, which we will use as the numeraire good throughout.
Given this production technology, vintage proﬁle of prices and the menu
of available vintages of machines, in each period workers choose, from this
menu, the type of machine that maximizes their proprietor’s income level.
This income level is the diﬀerence between the revenue generated by the sale
of the ﬁnal goods produced and the cost of the machine used to produce
them.
That is, if Tt denotes the set of available technology vintage ages and At
the set of associated productivity levels of the machines, then a worker with
human capital level h will choose a technology from the technology choice








Let wt (h) be the wage rate of a worker with human capital level h,t h e n
competition and free entry on the demand side of the labor market implies
2The notational convention that we will use in this paper follows Chari and Hopenhayn
(1991) in the sense that τ represents ‘vintage age’. That is, At represents the frontier
technology level and At−τ is the frontier technology level of τ periods ago. For notational
convenience, we will, every once in a while, switch between the notation of technology in
its levels, i.e. At, and technology growth rates, i.e. gt =
At−At−1
At−1 .
3This setup of the production function is similar to the preference setup used by Bres-
nahan (1981) to estimate marginal cost proﬁles and markups in the American Automobile
Industry.
6zero proﬁts such that the wage rate of a worker with skill level h equals
revenue minus capital expenditures. Mathematically, this implies
wt (h)=hAt−τ − Pt,τ,f o ra l lτ ∈ Υt (h)( 4 )
When we aggregate over workers of all human capital levels, we obtain the
relevant demand sets. Let Pt be the vector of prices charged for the available
machines, then the set of buyers of machines of vintage age τ, which we will









These sets determine the demand for each of the available vintages of ma-
chines.
2.3 Capital goods producers
Machine designs are assumed to be patented for M periods and each period
there is one new machine design patented.
During the ﬁrst M periods of a machine design’s life, the particular ma-
chine is supplied by a monopolist ﬁrm. After the patent expires the machine
design is public domain and there is perfect competition in the supply of
these machines.
In order to show the generality of our results we will allow for one mo-
nopolist selling all M patented machines, M monopolistic competitors that
each sell one particular vintage of machine, or any case in between.
Hence, each supplier may supply more than one patented machine design.
We will denote the number of supplies of patented machines by N ≤ M and
index them by n.T h e f u n c t i o n ιt (τ)i d e n t i ﬁes the supplier of machines of
vintage τ.
The technology used to produce machines is as follows. Units of the
ﬁnal (consumption) good are only input needed in machine production. We
make this assumption to avoid having to deal with the selection of workers
across the ﬁnal goods and capital good producing sectors. Production of a






7units of the ﬁnal good. The cost parameter cτ > 0 depends vintage age,
in order to allow us to take into account potential learning by doing in the
production of machines. For example, Irwin and Klenow (1994) show that
learning by doing eﬀects are important in the production of random access
memory (RAM) chips.
The question that is left is how these machine producers end up choosing
the prices of their machines. Suppose supplier n supplies a total of vn vin-
tages. Let τn1,τn2,τn3,...τnvnbe the vintages supplied by supplier n.T h e n






Throughout this paper, we will focus on Pure Strategy Nash (PSN) equilibria.
For the particular problem at hand here this implies that supplier n takes
the prices set by the other supplies, which we will denote by the vector P
0
t,n,
and the productivity levels the machines, i.e. the At−τ for τ ∈ Tt,a sg i v e n .
Given these variables, producer n chooses the prices of his machines to





























Where Kt,τni equals the mass of workers that demand machines of vintage
age τni at the prices set4.
Because patents expire after M periods, these best response sets only
apply to τ =0 ,...,M − 1. For machines that were designed M or more
periods ago, perfect competition implies that price must equal average cost
and that free entry drives both to zero. Hence, Pt,τ =0f o rτ ≥ M.


















for τ =0 ,...,M− 1a n da r ez e r of o rτ ≥ M.










82.4 Patent race and innovation
3 Equilibrium and balanced growth
In this section we derive the equilibrium outcome and prove the relevant
properties of this economy along its balanced growth path. These are the
properties that drive our spurious investment speciﬁc technological change
We derive the equilibrium in four steps. First of all, we solve for the
machine demand decisions made by the workers in the ﬁnal goods sector.
Secondly, we obtain the optimal price setting strategies by the suppliers
of the diﬀerent vintages of machines in response to the demand functions
d e r i v e di nt h eﬁrst step. Thirdly, we derive the equilibrium in the R&D
sector and the implied pattern of innovations ﬁnanced by the proﬁts made
by the capital goods producers and derived in the second step. Finally, we
combine the results of the ﬁrst three steps to derive the balanced growth path
our model economy. We only describe the main results and their intuition
here. The details of the derivations are left for Appendix A.
3.1 Demand for machines
Because our setup in the ﬁnal goods sector is similar to that of the car market
in Bresnahan (1981), so are the resulting demand functions. They satisfy the
following two main properties, independent of the set of technologies sold,
i.e. At, and the prices set for the patented designs, i.e. Pt.
First of all, better workers end up using better machines. That is, there
is endogenous assortative matching between workers and machines. Mathe-
matically, this can be written as
For h0 >h ,i fh ∈ Dt (τ,Pt,At)t h e nh0 / ∈ Dt (τ0,Pt,At) forall τ0 > τ. (10)
Assortative matching between machines and workers is a natural outcome
when a technology exhibits capital-skill complementaries, like in the ﬁnal
goods sector in our model. Jovanovic (1999) is an example where this is the
case as well.
This assortative matching result also implies that the demand sets are
connected. That is, for vintages of machines for which there is positive





where 0 ≤ ht,τ < ht,τ ≤ 1( 1 1 )
9where the upper and lowerbounds of the set are determined by the prices
and in the productivity levels of the vintages sold. It also follows from this
assortative matching result that the set of workers that is indiﬀerent between
the choice of two machines is negligible. That is, the size of these demand sets,
and thus the demand for each of the diﬀerent vintages, is uniquely determined
by the prices that are set and the productivity levels of the machines.
Secondly, perfect competition for the machines of vintage age M and
older implies that machines of a design older than M, i.e. a design for which
the patent has expired for more than one period, are not demanded anymore.
Their demand set is the empty set in equilibrium. That is,
Dt (τ,Pt,At)=∅ for τ >M (12)
The derivation of this result is straightforward. The quadratic production
technology for machines implies that perfect competition on the machines
for which the patent has expired will drive their price to zero. Among the
machines that are essentially free, the workers will always choose the best
one, i.e. τ = M, and will not use machines of an older vintage age.
3.2 Price schedule of machines
The properties of the demand sets proven above imply that the amount of
machines of vintage age τ equals
Kt,τ = ht,τ − ht,τ (13)
This result can be used to derive the equilibrium price schedule of machines.
Before doing so, we ﬁrst formally deﬁne what we mean by the PSN price
setting equilibrium in this market.








in this market satisﬁes two properties. First
of all, for those vintages for which the patent has expired the price is zero.
That is, Pt,τ =0f o ra l lτ ≥ M. Secondly, each of the suppliers of patented
v i n t a g eo fm a c h i n e sc h o o s e si t sp r i c e sa sp a r to fi t sb e s tr e s p o n s es e tw i t h
respect to the prices set by the other producers. That is, let P∗
t,n be the
prices set by supplier n for the machines it supplies and let P∗0
t,n the prices









for all n =1 ,...,N (14)
10It turns out that, for all possible technology menus At and all possible per-
mutations of suppliers over the M patented vintages, there exists a unique
equilibrium price schedule. The equilibrium price schedule has several rel-
evant properties that are independent of At, of the way suppliers are dis-
tributed over the M newest machine designs, and of the cost coeﬃcients
{cτ}
∞
τ=0. The existence and uniqueness of the price schedule as well as the
details underlying the properties are derived in A. Here we limit ourselves to
the description of the properties that are relevant for the rest of our analysis.
The ﬁrst property is that, in equilibrium, prices are set such that there is
strictly positive demand for all M patented vintages. Mathematically, this
boils down to that
Dt (τ,Pt,At) 6= ∅ for τ =0 ,...,M (15)
in the PSN price setting equilibrium.
T h es e c o n dp r o p e r t yi st h a ti nt h i se quilibrium suppliers make strictly
positive proﬁts of the supply of each of the individual patented designs. That
is,
Pt,τ >c τAt−τKt,τ > 0 for all τ =0 ,...,M− 1( 1 6 )
such that for each patented vintage, all of which are produced with a decreas-
ing returns to scale technology, price exceeds average cost and thus proﬁts
are strictly positive.
The ﬁnal two properties are most easily written in terms of prices per
eﬃciency units. For this purpose, we deﬁne the price per eﬃciency unit of a
machine of vintage age τ as b Pt,τ ≡ Pt,τ/At−τ.
In terms of the price schedule per eﬃciency unit, the third relevant prop-
e r t yf o rw h a ti st oc o m ei st h a tp r i c e sp e re ﬃciency unit are increasing in
the quality of the machines. Formally,
b Pt,τ is strictly decreasing in τ (17)
That is, the older the vintage age of the machine, the lower the quality, and
t h el o w e rt h ep r i c ep e re ﬃciency unit.
The ﬁnal property of the price per eﬃciency unit schedule is that it only
depends on the cost parameters, {cτ}
M−1
τ=0 , the patent length, M,a n dt h e
productivity proﬁle of the vintages, At = {At,...,A t−M}.M o r e o v e rt h ep r i c e
per eﬃciency unit schedule is homogenous of degree zero in the productivity
levels of the vintages.
11Formally, let b P∗
t be the equilibrium schedule of prices per eﬃciency unit,
then this last property implies
b P
∗







such that b P∗
t is solely a function of the cost parameters for the vintages sold in
the market, i.e. {cτ}
M−1
τ=0 , and the productivity proﬁle, i.e. At. Furthermore,
the function b P is homogenous of degree zero in At.T h i sp r o p e r t yi sr e l e v a n t ,
because along the balanced growth path of our model the productivity proﬁle
will growt at a constant rate and thus the price per eﬃciency unit proﬁle
across vintages of machines will be constant.
3.3 Innovations and technological progress
3.4 Balanced growth path
4M e a s u r e m e n t
Now that we have derived the properties of prices in equilibrium it is time to
consider what we would infer about investment speciﬁc (embodied) techno-
logical change in our model economy. That is, what would we measure if we
would apply standard price index methods to calculate a capital price index
in this economy?
Before we show what the application of price index methods yields in
terms of investment speciﬁc technological change, we ﬁrst illustrate what we
would like to measure. We do so by deriving an aggregate production function
for the ﬁnal goods sector as well as for the individual workers. We show that
in those two production functions capital and labor are not separable.
In the last subsection here, we show that the estimation of a spurious
capital price index, i.e. a capital price index for a capital stock that does not
exist, might lead to very misleading conclusions.
4.1 Aggregate production function representation
For the derivation of the aggregate production function for the ﬁnal goods
sector, we follow Fisher (1969). We consider the decision of a planner that
is endowed with a continuum for workers of measure Lt that is uniformly




as well as with a sequence of capital
12stocks of diﬀerent vintages {Kt,τ}
M
τ=0. Given these endowments of production
factors, the planner chooses an allocation of labor over the capital stocks to
maximize output.
Let Kτ (h) ≥ 0 be the amount of capital of vintage age τ that is assigned
to workers of type h and,equivalently, let Lh(τ) ≥ 0 the amount of workers
of human capital level h that is assigned to machines of vintage age τ.
The planner chooses these allocations to maximize output, which is given







hmin{Kτ (h),L h (h)}dh (19)
and subject to the resource constraints that the capital assigned does not
exceed the capital available
Z h
h
Kτ (h)dh ≤ Kt,τ (20)








The solution to this optimization problem coincides with the decentral-
ized equilibrium outcome in our model economy. It entails the assortative
matching between workers and machines.
Denote the human capital level of the least skilled worker that is still
assigned a machine as
h













and let the oldest vintage of machines assigned to workers be
τ








These deﬁnitions allow us to write the optimal assignment as follows.
Kτ (h)=Lh(τ)=
½






0o t h e r w i s e (24)


















































This production function exhibits constant returns to scale. However, be-
cause of the assignment of capital over workers, capital and labor are not
separable in this production function. On the contrary, the amounts of cap-
ital and labor interact in a complex manner through the assignment of ma-
chines to workers, which determines the h∗
τ’s.
Note that this result is both true at the aggregate level for the ﬁnal goods
sector, where h =1a n dh = 0 as well as for the individual worker where
h = h = h.
Hence, there is no aggregate production function representation in terms






that is homogenous of degree
one in the capital inputs {Kt,τ}
∞
τ=0 and the aggregate labor input L.T h e r e -
fore, the concept of a capital price index is ill-deﬁned in this model. A capital
price index does not exist, because there is no properly deﬁned theoretical
aggregate capital stock.
The non-existence of an aggregate capital stock in this model should
not be such a big surprise. Fisher (1969) already showed that such a capital
stock only exists when the underlying vintage production functions are Cobb-
Douglas. However, the assumption of a ﬁxed capital labor ratio in our model
yields that the underlying vintage production function here is Leontieﬀ rather
than Cobb-Douglas.
4.2 What we would like to measure
So, what would we like to infer about technological change in the ﬁnal goods
sector of this economy? It is important to answer this question, because the
answer to this question provides us with the theoretical benchmark.
14The ﬁrst observation about technological change is that there is no growth
in total factor productivity in this model. This follows from the construction
of the aggregate production function above. That is, if the ﬁnal goods sector
uses the same amounts of labor and the same number of machines for each
particular vintage at two diﬀerent points in time, then it would produce
the same amount of output at both points in time. There is no technological
progress in this model that shifts the productivity of all factors of production
in the same way, where each vintage of machine is considered a seperate
production factor because there is no aggregate capital stock, and thus TFP
growth is zero.
All productivity growth in this model is embodied in the new machines
that come available over time. Without the adoption of the new machines
productivity levels in the ﬁnal goods sector would not be increasing over
time.
Hence, what we would like to get outo fa na c c o u n t i n ge x e r c i s et h a t
distinguishes between total factor productivity and embodied technological
change is that TFP growth is zero in the ﬁnal goods sector and that all
growth is due to the quality improvements of machines.
Would our current methods of measuring investment speciﬁc technological
change (and of growth accounting) yield this result in the model economy
here? What would happen if we would apply growth accounting techniques
in our model economy to assess the contributions of total factor productivity
growth and of investment speciﬁc technological change?
U s i n gg r o w t ha c c o u n t i n gf o rt h eﬁnal goods sector involves dividing the
growth of output in this sector into its three contributing factors. The ﬁrst
is the growth of the labor input. The second is capital deepening, i.e. the
growth of capital inputs as measured by a “quality adjusted” capital stock.
We will elaborate on how such a “quality adjusted” capital stock is measured
below. The ﬁnal part is TFP growth, i.e. the Solow residual, it is simply
the part of output growth that is not attributed to growth of the capital and
labor inputs.
In practice, this boils down to applying a log-linear approximation to
obtain the decomposition
(lnYt − lnYt−1)=( l nZt − lnZt−1)+sL,t (lnLt − lnLt−1)+( 1− sL,t)(lnKt − lnKt−1)
(27)
where Zt represents the measured level of TFP, sL,t is the share of labor
in the ﬁnal goods sector, and Kt is the measured quality adjusted capital
aggregate.
15As derived above, on the balanced growth path, output of the ﬁnal goods
sector grows at a constant rate g, the labor share in the ﬁnal goods sector is
constant, i.e. sL,t = sL, and the labor inputs are constant and equal one, i.e.
Lt =1f o ra l lt. This implies that, along the balanced growth path in our
model economy, this decomposition simpliﬁes to
g =( l nZt − lnZt−1)+( 1− sL)(lnKt − lnKt−1)( 2 8 )
Thus, on the balanced growth path our growth accounting exercise will at-
tribute output growth either to TFP growth, i.e. t7o the growth of Zt,o r
to capital deepening, i.e. the growth of Kt. The growth rate of TFP is the
residual, after the subtraction of the capital deepening contribution from g.
Hence, to understand what we would infer about TFP and embodied
technological change in our model ec o n o m y ,w eh a v et oc o n s i d e rh o wt h e
capital aggregate Kt would be constructed in our model economy.
Since there is full depreciation of machines in every period, the capital
aggregate Kt in our model economy would equal the capital expenditures
in period t deﬂated by a capital price index. Since ﬁrms in the ﬁnal goods
sector make zero proﬁts in equilibrium, capital expenditures equal total rev-
enue minus the wage bill. That is, capital expenditures equal (1 − sL)Yt.
Consequently, the capital aggregate Kt is constructed as




where PK,t is the capital price index which represents the relative price of
the capital goods in terms of the consumption good.
Substitution of the above capital aggregate into the growth accounting
equation yields that TFP will be measured as a weighted average of output
growth and the capital price declines. That is,
(lnZt − lnZt−1)=sLg +( 1− sL)(lnPK,t − lnPK,t−1)( 3 0 )
Hence, what is crucial for the growth accounting results in our model is the
capital price index PK,t used for it.
Since we already argued that all growth in the ﬁnal goods sector of this
economy is due to quality increases in capital and that there is no TFP
growth, i.e.
(lnZt − lnZt−1)=0 ( 3 1 )





However, there is nothing in our model that assures us that this is the ac-
tual percentage change in the relative price of capital, PK,t, measured using
common price index methods.
4.3 What would capital price indices measure?
There are, in principle, many diﬀerent ways to construct such a price index
PK,t, each of which essentially employs a diﬀerent price index formula. Fur-
thermore, since in every period some machines exit the market while others
enter, one also has to decide on how to deal with the inclusion of new goods.
The aim of this paper is not to be an exposition on the many price index
methods. Instead, it is meant to illustrate a conceptual problem with the
application of them in the simple model economy introduced. Therefore,
we will limit our analysis to one of the most common price index formulas.
Furthermore, we will consider only two ways of dealing with the inclusion of
new goods. The qualitative results derived from the resulting price indices
also hold for the application of other common price index methods. That
is, we will emphasize the conceptual issues with constructing a capital price
index in this model and these issues are robust to what type of capital price
index is constructed.
T h ep r i c ei n d e xf o r m u l aw eu s ei st h eL a s p e y r e sf o r m u l a . I ti sau s e f u l
benchmark, because as Frisch (1936) and Kon¨ us (1939) already showed, it
yields an upperbound on inﬂa t i o ni nt h es t a n d a r dc a s ei nw h i c ht h e r ea r en o
new capital goods and there exists a proper capital aggregate.
The ﬁrst way we deal with new goods to ignore them and simply apply the
price index formulas to models of machines that are sold in the two periods
between which we calculate capital price inﬂation. This yields the matched
model indices used in, for example, Aizcorbe et al. (2000) and that are
commonly applied to capital price indices by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The Laspeyres matched model index that aims to measure capital price








− 1( 3 3 )
17It measures the percentage change in the cost from t − 1t ot of buying the
period t − 1 machines that are available in period t.
For this matched model Layspeyres index we ﬁnd that, on the balanced
growth path of our economy, it yields a constant percentage decline in the




(M) < 0f o r a l l t (34)
The magnitude of the measured price declines depends on cross-vintage pro-




b Pt,τ − b Pt−1,τ−1
b Pt−1,τ−1
(35)
which in its turn depends on the length of the patent M, the cost parameters
{cτ}
M−1
τ=0 and the growth rate g.
The second way we deal with new goods is to include them by using a
hedonic regression model to impute the price of the models that enter and
exit for the periods that their prices are not observed. This would result in
a hedonic price index.
The Laspeyres hedonic price index that aims to measure capital price









− 1( 3 6 )
where P0
t,M+1 i st h ei m p u t e dp r i c eo ft h em a c h i n e so fv i n t a g ea g eM +1a t
time t that is imputed using a hedonic regression. In general P0
t,M+1depends
on the speciﬁc hedonic regression applied. However, on the balanced growth
path the price of the vintage of age M already equals zero, so any reasonable
imputation method would infer that all worse vintages should also have a
price equal to zero. Consequently, if P0
t,M+1 =0 ,t h e n
π
(H)
t =( 1− st−1,M)π
(M)
t (37)
where st−1,M is the share of the vintage of age M at time t−1a n dπ
(L,M)
t is
the inﬂation rate measured using the Laspeyres matched model index deﬁned
above. Because st−1,M > 0a n dπ
(M)
t < 0 are both constant over time on the




(H) < 0f o r a l l t (38)
18Thus, just like the matched model index, the hedonic Laspeyres capital price
index implies that a constant rate of decline in the relative price of capital
compared to the consumption good along the balanced growth path.
Hence, both price indices that we consider here would ﬁnd a constant
rate of decline in the relative price of investment goods, consistent with the
observation that drives the results in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell
(1997). These measured declines, i.e. π(M) and π(H), are in no way related
t ot h er e l a t i v ep r i c ed e c l i n et h a tw ew o u l dl i k et om e a s u r e .T h a ti s ,t h e r ei s










In order to see why, it is useful to consider what mechanisms underly the
price declines measured by the capital price indices.
5N u m e r i c a l e x a m p l e
6 Implications
Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) assume a Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology in their analysis and thus the a capital aggregate in their model is
well-deﬁned. From an empirical point of view the question is thus whether
this
7C o n c l u s i o n
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21AP r o o f s
Proof of equations (10) and (11): To see why (10) is true, consider h0 >h
and τ0 > τ,t h e nh ∈ D(τ,Pt,At) implies that
∀ s ∈ Tt : At−τh − Pt,τ ≥ At−sh − Pt,s
or, equivalently, in terms of marginal beneﬁts and costs
∀ s ∈ Tt :( At−τ − At−s)h ≥ Pt,τ − Pt,s
Consequently, because for all τ0 > τ strictly positive technological progress implies At−τ0 >
At−τ, the marginal beneﬁts from updating for the worker of type h0 exceed those of the
worker of type h.T h a ti s ,
∀τ0 > τ :( At−τ − At−τ0)h0 > (At−τ − At−τ0)h ≥ Pt,τ − Pt,τ0
This implies that it must thus be true that h0 / ∈ Dt (τ0,Pt,At) for all τ0 > τ.
The result of equation (10) implies that the demand sets are connected for the following
reason. Suppose there would be a demand set that was not connected, then there exist
h00 >h 0 >hsuch that h00 ∈ Dt (τ,Pt,At), h0 ∈ Dt (τ0,Pt,At), and h ∈ Dt (τ,Pt,At)
where τ 6= τ0. However, if τ > τ0, then the choices of h00 and h0 do not satisfy assortative
matching. On the other hand, if τ0 > τ, then the choices of h0 and h do not satisfy
assortative matching. Hence, the demand sets need to be connected.
If the demand sets are connected and subsets of the unit interval, then they have to
be of the form given in equation (11).
The proof that the set of all workers that is indiﬀerent between two machines is
negligible is a bit more involved. Let Ht denote the set of all human capital levels for
which the workers are indiﬀerent between two vintages of machines at time t.S i n c et h e
human capital levels are uniformly distributed on the unit interval, it suﬃces to prove that
Ht contains a ﬁnite number of elements. Since we have already derived that workers will
only use technologies {0,...,M} there are only a ﬁnite number of combinations between
which workers can be indiﬀerent.
We will show that, if a worker of type h is indiﬀerent between two intermediate goods,
then no other worker will be. That is, deﬁne the set
H∗



















22We will simply show that ∀τ0 > τ : µ(H∗
t (τ,τ0)) = 0. Let h ∈ [0,1] be such that h ∈ Dt (τ)
as well as h ∈ Dt (τ0)f o rτ0 > τ.I nt h a tc a s e
At−τh − Pt,τ = At−τ0h − Pt,τ0
or equivalently
(At−τ − At−τ0)h = Pt,τ − Pt,τ0
This, however implies that for all h0 >h>h 00
(At−τ − At−τ0)h0 >P t,τ − Pt,τ0 > (At−τ − At−τ0)h00
such that the workers of type h0 >hwill prefer τ over τ0, while workers of type h00 <h
will do the opposite. Hence, H∗
t (τ,τ0)={h} and is of measure zero.
Proof of equations (15) through (18): We will prove these equations in
three steps. In the ﬁrst step, we prove equation (15) and show that, irrespective of At,
M,a n d{cτ}
M
τ=0, the suppliers will set their prices such that there is demand for each of
t h ev i n t a g e s .I nt h es e c o n ds t e p ,w ed e r i v et h eﬁrst order conditions that, given that it is
interior, determine the optimal price schedule and show that the suppliers make strictly
positive proﬁts of the supply of each of the patented vintages. That is, we prove equation
(16). In the ﬁnal step, we prove the properties of the price schedule per eﬃciency unit
that are formalized in equations (17) and (18).
Strictly positive demand for all M newest vintages: In order to prove equation
(15), it turns out to be useful to introduce the function that relates a vintage back to its
supplier. We denote this function by ι(τ). It is equal to the index number of the supplier
that supplies machines of vintage τ.
Furthermore, to keep track of which vintages are supplied by the same supplier and
which are not, we deﬁne the indicator function
I [a = b]=
½
1i fa = b
0i fa 6= b
¾
(40)
so that I [ι(τ)=ι(τ0)] is equal to one if vintages τ and τ0 are supplied by the same supplier
and zero otherwise.
For this proof we will consider the supplier of vintage τ and consider the eﬀect of its
price setting on the proﬁts made from the supply of vintage τ,a sw e l la st h a to fv i n t a g e
ages τ−1a n dτ+1. Here we assume, without loss of generality that these adjacent vintages
have prices set such that Kt,τ−1,K t,τ+1 > 0 in case vintage τ would not be supplied. We
will distinguish the cases τ =0 ,f o rw h i c hKt,τ−1 is irrelevant, and τ = M − 1, for which
we know that there are no proﬁts made of vintage τ +1 .
For this vintage τ, we will show that there exists a price Pt,τ > 0 such that the supplier
makes strictly positive proﬁts of the supply of vintage τ as well as that this price increases
t h es u mo ft h ep r o ﬁts over all three vintages (τ −1,τ,τ +1), or any two of these vintages
that include τ. That is, independent of the prices of the adjacent vintages for which
t h e r ei sd e m a n d ,t h es u p p l i e ro fv i n t a g eτ can increase its proﬁts, no matter whether it
23only owns the patent for vintage τ or any of the patents for the adjacent vintages. The
assortative matching result implies that looking at three adjacent vintages is enough for
this argument, because the price set for vintage τ at the margin only aﬀects the demand
for the adjacent vintages.
Let us ﬁrst determine the reservation price level, above which vintage τ will not be
demanded at all. This price level is determine db yt h et y p eo fw o r k e r ,t h a t ,w i t h o u tt h e
availability of vintage τ,i si n d i ﬀerent between vintage τ − 1a n dτ +1 . W ed e n o t et h e
human capital level of this worker by e h. It has to satisfy




1f o r τ =0
Pt,τ−1−Pt,τ+1
At−τ+1−At−τ−1 for τ > 0 (42)
Hence, demand for vintage τ implies that its price level much be such that
At−τe h − Pt,τ ≥ At−τ+1e h − Pt,τ−1 = At−τ−1e h − Pt,τ+1 (43)




























⎦ for τ > 0
(44)
≡ e Pt,τ (45)
Hence, e Pt,τ is the maximum price per eﬃcieny unit at which the supplier of vintage τ
faces positive demand.
The supplier of vintage τ has three options. First all, it can choose to make vintage
τ available for free, in which case Pt,τ =0a n dt h eﬁrm would make non-positive proﬁts.
Secondly, it could choose Pt,τ ≥ At−τ e Pt,τ at which it faces no demand and proﬁts are
zero. Finally, it can choose a price Pt,τ ≥ At−τ
³
e Pt,τ − ε
´
where 0 < ε < e Pt,τ.
The ﬁrm will choose the third option, whenever that option increases the proﬁts its
makes over all the vintages its supplies. In the following we will show that, independent
of the prices Pt,τ−1 and Pt,τ+1,t h e r ee x i s t sa nε > 0f o rw h i c ht h i si st h ec a s e .
We will consider the proﬁts that the the supplier of vintage τ makes when it chooses
a price equal to
∧
Pt,τ = e Pt,τ − ε for ε > 0 (46)
For a small enough ε > 0w h e nKt,τ−1,K t,τ+1 > 0 the choice of
∧
Pt,τwill not aﬀect the
demand of vintages other than those of vintage ages τ − 1, τ and τ + 1. Hence, for small
ε > 0, which turns out to be the relevant case in this proof, what matters for the supplier
of vintage τ and what determines the price it chooses is whether it also supplies vintage
τ − 1, and/or τ + 1, or neither of them.
24At the price
∧
Pt,τ = e Pt,τ − ε the demand for vintage τ can be shown to equal
Kt,τ =
µ








The new proﬁts over the three adjacent vintages for the supplier of vintage τ is given
by


















































































where a>0a n db>0. In particular, they equal
























































Note that the ﬁrst two terms of equation (49) equal the proﬁts that the supplier of
vintage τ would have made of the two adjacent vintages, if it would have owned any of
them. The term aε − bε2 represents the additional proﬁts earned due to the supply of
vintage τ at price e Pt,τ −ε. Hence, the supplier of vintage τ would always set a price that
generates strictly positive demand for that vintage if there exists an ε > 0f o rw h i c ht h i s
additional proﬁt is strictly positive. Since there always is an ε > 0f o rw h i c haε−bε2 > 0,
it always the case that the supplier of vintage τ will supply that vintage at a price that
generates strictly positive demand.
Strictly positive proﬁts: This follows as a corollary from the proof above. The supplier
of the vintage τ can always choose its price to strictly increase its proﬁts relative to zero.
b Pt,τ is strictly decreasing in τ: This follows from an induction argument. We have
proven above that in the equilibrium there must be strictly positive demand for each of
the vintages of age τ =0 ,...,M− 1, i.e. Kt,τ > 0 in equilibrium. In terms of the prices
























b Pt,τ − b Pt,τ+1
´i
for τ =1 ,...,M− 1
(55)










b Pt,τ − b Pt,τ+1
´
(56)
Hence, if the price per eﬃciency unit for vintage age τ is larger than that for τ +1 ,t h e n
i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tt h ep r i c ep e re ﬃciency unit for vintage age τ − 1 is higher than
that of vintage τ. The only thing we need to proof our claim is a initial result and then
we can apply an induction argument.
We do know that in equilibrium the supplier of vintage age M − 1 will choose a
price that is strictly positive, such that b Pt,M−1 > 0. Furthermore, we know that perfect
competition in the supply of vintage M will drive its price to zero, such that b Pt,M =0 .
Hence, we know that
³
b Pt,M−1 − b Pt,M
´
> 0. Applying our induction argument thus yields
that this implies that
³
b Pt,τ − b Pt,τ+1
´
> 0f o rτ =0 ,...,M − 1. Hence b Pt,τ is strictly
decreasing in τ.
26b P∗






where b P(.) is homogenous of degree zero in At: Supplier i












The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for proﬁt maximization in equilibrium imply that











However, note that these optimality conditions are homogenous of degree zero in At =
{At,...,A t−M}. This is because the demand functions that determine Kt,τ are homoge-
nouse of degree zero in At = {At,...,A t−M} and so are the marginal demand functions
∂Kt,τ/∂ b Pt,τ. Furthermore, besides the productivity levels in At the only other parameters
that show up in these equilibrium conditions are the cost parameters {cτ}
M−1
τ=0 .T h u st h e
equilibrium price per eﬃciency unit proﬁle is only a function of the productivity levels and
the cost parameters and it is homogenous of degree zero in the productivity levels.
Furthermore, the system of equilibrium conditions, implied by the optimality condi-
tions above, is linear in the prices per eﬃciency unit and it turns out to be straightforward
to show that it has one unique solution. That is, the PSN equilibrium exists and it is
unique.
Proof of equation (34) : The following is the proof of equation (34). The matched



















where the shares s∗









s=0 At−1−s b Pt−1,sKt−1,s
(61)
and represent the expenditure share in period t − 1 of vintage age τ in the expenditures
on machines that are also available at time t.T h ei n ﬂation rates b πt,τ equal
b πt,τ =
³
b Pt,τ+1 − b Pt−1,τ
´.
b Pt−1,τ (62)
On the balanced growth path both s∗
t−1,τ and b πt,τ will be constant over time. Furthermore,
because the price per eﬃciency unit is declining in the vintage age, b πt,τ < 0 for all τ.A n d
thus π
(M)
t is constant over time and negative.
27